There is a great consensus on the positive impact of credit access on farmers' incomes and consumption, however, its effect on income inequality among different population segments is still a controversial issue. The paper aims to examine these concerns through using the mixed data collected from the sample of 193 households surveyed (demand-side) and in-depth interviewees with the key credit providers (supply-side) in Lao Cai, the sixth poorest province in Vietnam. At the grass root level, it is evident that better credit access not only significantly positive influences on the effectiveness of agricultural production, but also is the driving force for better structural transition within cultivation versus livestock. Besides this, it enhances both on-farm and off-farm income as well as the well-being of rural households. At the community-impact level, surprisingly, the financial development without agriculture-related supports causes to the negative effect on the distribution of agricultural outcomes and prolongs the inequality in the locality. In addition, an alarm regarding latent social issues has been generating from the preferential credit screen under the community-based lending method. Finally, policy implications are discussed to enhance the effectiveness and outreach of credit in the locality.
Introduction
Despite the long history and a huge treasure trove of empirical studies, the study of the role of microfinance still has substantial attractiveness. The recent empirical evidence also emphasizes the multi-faceted importance of agricultural investment in developing countries. It is considered a key driver of poverty reduction, food security, improvement of income and the living standards as well as effective risk-coping strategies for farmers (FAO, 2017; 2018 Food and Agriculture Organization; IFC, 2014; Khandker et al., 2016; OI, 2013; Tuan, 2010) . According to WorldBank (2008) , the only pathway to escape the poverty of smallholder farmers is to enhance agricultural productivity and income, in which credit plays sine qua non for meeting their investment and adopting better technologies. Unfortunately, in fact, farmers in developing countries, like Vietnam, are facing with various endogenous and exogenous barriers to access credit service, that causes to reduce a large of farmers' potential exploited and agricultural productivity (HLPE, 2013) . Therefore, the credit scarcity for smallholders must have to end and improve their livelihoods and miserable lives.
In the line of studies of how credit impacts on rural households, the empirical findings show the mixed influence, positively and negatively. The systematically review of Stewart et al. (2012) demonstrates the effects of credit accessibility on households' welfares, but not always, via four aspects comprising: (i) investment in on-farm and/or off-farm activities, consequently, (ii) increase income and expenditure, (iii) enhancement of human capital, and (iv) accumulation of physical assets. The same controversy has also been occurring in Vietnam. The series of following work, like Pham et al. (2019) , Bui et al. (2018) , Duong et al. (2014) , Lensink et al. (2012) , proved that better credit access enables to encourage the economic opportunities and enhances the living standard, and so forth. By contrast, Phan et al. (2014) concluded that credit insignificant effects on income, and T. Dufhues (2007) , Cuong (2008 ), Do Xuan et al. (2016 proposed their critical reports that microcredit in Vietnam is designed for the poor and disadvantaged households but its performance serves mainly the non-poor groups. It is also highly questionable whether the remarkably positive achievements of formal credit, especially Viet Nam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), on poverty reduction and agricultural development, that was shown very well in the official reports (Nguyen et al., 2007; Sauli et al., 2017; Thanh Tam, 2011; World Bank, 2014) . Similarly, the 2. Different competition of financing system at district level measured by a number of formal, semi-formal providers, and their credit volume as well as the average growth rate.
3. Different altitudes (lowland and upland) cause different levels of the agro-ecological zone, productive infrastructure, market access, and demographics; 4. Whether being received financial supports from the central Government. The subsidies are devoted for disadvantaged areas, including poor villages, communes, and districts regulated at 135 (Note 1) and/or 30A (Note 2) programs.
With regards to the household survey, the study selected 50% of villagers, who are borrowing a loan from VBARD at non-poor villages and 50% of households taking a loan from VBSP at poor villages. And, 50% of other people were chosen by the snowball sampling technique to find out the access-constrained credit people during the last two years. The method was introduced by Biernacki et al. (1981) and widespread applied in qualitative sociological research that is hard to identify respondents through the formal way (e.g. drug users, HIV-infected people). Almost surveyed households were stratified in accordance with three levels of wealth classes in the village based on the official poverty baseline issued by MOLISA (2016) . The lists of banks' borrowers are taken from the village headmen. In overall, 193 households are selected in this study (Table 1) . Concerning data collection about financial issues in Vietnam, concisely, it is relatively delicate and not easy to ask directly from both lenders and borrowers. For this reason, the authors combined both formal/direct interview and informal/cross-check data collection in order to achieve a sophisticated analysis of demand-side and supply-side with the best way possible. The study collected both secondary and primary data through our fieldwork conducted from 2016 to 2018.
Firstly, key informant interviews (KI) with 10 local managers related to agricultural development at three administrative levels. Especially, the in-depth interview with the officers working at the State Bank of Vietnam in Lao Cai to synthesize the current policy system, comprising rights and obligations of the particular bank compared to well-intended targets as the central Government's expectation.
Secondly, the in-depth interviews with financial suppliers collect the qualitative data regarding lending performance and the relevant figures in the research topic. At the provincial level, fifteen interviews for all formal and semi-formal financial institutions were conducted but the thoroughness depends on to what extent that provider participates on the agricultural credit market. At the lower level, the author carried out six interviews of the head of credit management of VBARD and VBSP. Besides this, several credit officers and the local authorities also paid attention to exploit their activities in the lending process.
Finally, the well-designed household survey was conducted in order to capture the cross-sectional microdata on (i) general characteristics of respondents; (ii) farming activities; actual and desired investment; (iii) features of credit source obtained and advantages/disadvantages in access; and (iv) the impacts of each credit source on households' agricultural credit and their lives. Vol. 15, No. 7 2019 In this section, the study provides an overview of the agricultural credit market in research site with regards to supply, demand and the financial services exchanged in the market. Figure 2 demonstrates the presence of Lao Cai rural financial suppliers, comprising three typical categories (formal, semi-formal and informal) and direct Government's subsidies (i.e. non-reimbursable aid). In spite of the density of formal credit sources, in fact, farmers there are still facing with many difficulties in access these funds for their agricultural production plans. Normally, they, therefore, come to informal credit as the secondary and alternative options. Like previous studies, our study also reiterates the obvious coexistence of informal financial providers, that is well-documented in developing countries in general and Vietnam in particular (T. Dufhues, 2007; Le Thi Minh et al., 2012; Quach et al., 2005; Sauli et al., 2017; Thanh Tam, 2011) . Germidis et al. (1991) argued that the reasons for this coexist are weak legal institutions and low levels of income. Furthermore, the financial market in the Northern mountainous region is characterized as the quasi-monopoly and heavy asymmetric information due to principal-agent effects and nepotism. As a result, it causes to not only high transaction costs for both of borrowers and lenders but also creates difficulties in accessibility to (preferential) loans and distorted credit rationing (T. Dufhues, 2007;  T. Dufhues et al., 2005; T. B. Dufhues et al., 2002) .
The most significant attempt of Vietnamese policymakers in providing credit to farmers is to establish and nurture two state-owned and well-intended banks, VBARD and VBSP, regardless of various criticisms from international/domestic sponsors and researchers (ADB, 2010; T. Dufhues, 2007; Sauli et al., 2017; Thanh Tam, 2011) . These banks cooperate together to serve different segments of the rural credit market. VBSP serves low-income borrowers and VBARD provides credit services to higher income customers. Understandably, with huge and multifaceted subsidies, two banks have overwhelming proportions in rural market, tightening the performance of existing financial entities (FSF, WSF) and setting up the high barrier against new financial institutions to entry this market (BIDV, LV Post Bank). Clearly, the rural credit market is operating as the quasi-monopoly, in which VBARD is the largest provider in terms of outstanding loan at 81.24% (Figure 3 .a), meanwhile, VBSP has the biggest share regarding the number of clients at 71.81% (Figure 3 .b) in 2017. Furthermore, a merge consideration here is that these banks have been allocating their loanable fund as the way is not likely appropriate compared to Government's orders. Meanwhile VBARD have to provide credit for agricultural and rural development, but in fact, just only 18.3% of total credit volume devoted for agricultural production and the remaining proportion, much larger, spent to nonagriculture-related purpose. Similarly, the majority of VBSP-customers are the non-poor (66.8%). Moreover, in our household survey, a few interviewees are considered the beneficiaries of the poverty reduction, including 135, 30A programs and NMPRP-2 funded by World Bank (Note 3) subsidies. The VHLSS 2016 reported that a mere of 1% of rural households were benefited from favourable credit belong to poverty reduction project (GSO, 2016) . Thus, the credit allocation of banks seems to be a large barrier for the eligible farmers to (preferential) access credit.
Source: In-depth interviews and annual reports of financial providers surveyed, 2018 Table 2 presents the differentials in terms of loan's obtained by households divided by the different scale of agricultural production, simultaneously, denounces the inequity of disadvantaged households in access to preferential credit, which has been issued for them as the national fiscal burden. As currently regulated, all rural farmers equally access to non-collateral loans of VBARD at the maximum of 100 VND million with the subsidized interest rate in disadvantaged areas. In fact, the loan size statistically significant differs among customer groups, that was proportional to their agricultural production and investment scales. It can be seen that the large farmers had a debt, being over twice times as much as the small-scale household's amount. Surprisingly, small farmers suffered from the charge higher than others. The VBARD's staffs reported that small-scale debtors, on average, occur not only the higher transaction cost but also larger repayment risk. Therefore, the higher interest rate charged is considered likely reasonable compensation. Similarly, this behavior is also explained why the poor got a loan charged a higher fee than non-poor and better-off households in rural areas. The problem here is that the Vietnamese Government has granted partly operational cost and subsidized interest rate for VBARD as the compensation, that is proportional to the credit volume provided to disadvantage customers. However, they cannot fully take their eligible advantages. This finding also confirmed by the study of Saito et al. (1981) carried out in the Philippine credit market.
In another hand, traditional finance theory proves the negative impact of the term of loan and positive effect of loan size on lending interest rate under the consideration of price discrimination (Murphy et al., 1977; Varian, 1989) . However, in this study, our empirical examination unveils the state that small farmers are suffering from the triple unreasonable disadvantages compared to the basis of market principles. The rationale here is that with a lower loan amount and a shorter term, they should receive lower borrowing interest rates. But the reality is not so. This irrationality was also pointed at the empirical study of Moore et al. (2003) conducted in Barbados, in the Caribbean region. This finding is inconsistent the work of Do Xuan et al. (2016), who stated that formal credit channels are flowing to wealthier people, ethnic majority (Kinh group) and Nguyen et al. (2007) , the researchers presented the leakage rates in providing preferential credit was high and rural non-poor clients were the major beneficiaries.
With regards to VBSP, in the policy aspect, this bank provides preferential credit as well-defined programs regulated by Government accordance to with the particular targeting customer. In reality, there are no any significant differentials in terms of loan size, interest rate and duration among observed groups. They look like the same pieces of "welfare cake" divided for all local residents. Furthermore, because of highly subsidized interest and favorable conditions, beneficiaries are able to easily access to non-collateral loans and rarely complain about lending procedures. This point is also confirmed by the study of Sauli et al. (2017) conducted in Kao Bang and Bac Kan, the provinces also belong to the NMM region of Vietnam. It is important to be noted here that the decision making in disbursement without proper assessment of agricultural investment plans or training for loan use cause to high risk of default and the latent financial unsustainability. This has been warned by many domestic researchers and international sponsors (Sauli et al., 2017; Thanh Tam, 2011; WorldBank, 2014) , although official reports present good (VBSP, 2018) . Thus, there is a large room to examine carefully whether to maintain and nurture the cumbersome and ineffective bureaucracy with its loss-making performance.
Concerning the informal sector, as previous predicted, their main customers are normally the lowest segmentation, the group of unsatisfied applicants in the formal sector. Overall, the typical features this credit source are non-mortgage, simple procedure, small size, short-term, and to be used on urgent expenditure, like education fees, health problem, and diseases of crops and/or animals. However, these credit sources widely range of interest rate. Meanwhile, moneylender charged the loans is in very high rate (on average, 3.5%/month) (Note 4), the financial support from relatives and friends have a low rate, even zero. Arguably, using the informal credit often causes the latent socioeconomic shocks for borrowers but they have no better choices. On the other hand, some respondents stated that they always prefer firstly informal loan because of its convenience, quick disbursement and simplicity.
It is time to have a balanced perspective, including positive and negative, about the role of the formal and informal financial sector in developing countries, like Vietnam. Experimental evidence shows that moneylenders have many advantages in their lending method, such as good information on customers, simple procedures, quick disbursement, non-mortgage, flexible interest rate system in accordance with repayment capability and a very high return rate (Dufhues, 2007; Duong et al., 2002; Germidis et al., 1991; Giang, 2004; Madestam, 2014; Quach et al., 2005; Zeller, 1994) . Madestam (2014) also add more some interesting observation that informal lenders are able to prevent non-diligent behavior in loan usages, that bank cannot manage well through their local network. The same point of view, Varghese (2004) proposed a lending model namely the "bank-moneylender" linkage. In this, the new method exploits not only the bank's strength in the unlimited loanable fund, but also the private lenders' advantages in screening the local potential customers, credit quality and various good characteristics aforementioned. This model becomes superior to the lending group method of formal sector, in which customers' information is always distorted and incomplete by the local authorities due to nepotism and opportunism and power. Diagne et al. (2000) and Madestam (2014) concluded that formal and informal credit should be designed to become either complements or substitutes rather than to remove totally informal sources. The authors agree with this reasonable suggestion.
Impact of Credit Access to Agricultural Production in Lao Cai
In this section, the central contributions are to estimate the role of each credit source, more focus on formal loan, in agricultural production and households' welfares. With regards to loan's purpose, the most remarkable point here is that households use their loan obtained for various purposes, while formal financial institutions, usually, only disburse a specific purpose (Table 3 ). In essence, family's finance is fungible between on-farm and off-farm activities, thereby borrowers can be diverted agricultural credit to other income-generating activities, and vice versa (Khandker et al., 2016) . Thus, the role of credit is not only in agriculture-related activities but also in other multiple dimensions of rural households.
It can be seen that VBARD-borrowers use the loan for the right purpose, productive and generating-income activities, compared to their application. They also acknowledge the important role and positive impact of VBARD's loan on their farming activities (see Table 4 ). Pitifully, the coverage of credit provided by VBARD is relatively small.
In respect of VBSP's loan, in spite of its small volume, it was divided into many smaller pieces in accordance with the diversity of household's activities. Moreover, VBSP-clients devoted dominant money for raising castles as an important mean for land preparation and transporting at the harvesting time in rural areas, where agricultural production was taken place on sloppy hills without machinery. With an average loan size about 30 VND million, they are able to buy only one buffalo and able not increase significantly their agricultural investment (i.e. working capital), which can directly improve their productivity and farm income. It is concluded that microcredit provided by VBSP helps poor farmers reduce their miserable work in the fields but its influence on the improvement of income and livelihoods is not clear. Vol. 15, No. 7 2019 In respects of consumption, as argued elsewhere, it is considered a good measure of human well-being (Molini et al., 2008) . Normally, it is funded by mostly low non-farm income/wage from their uncertain work in the districts towns or Lao Cai city. Because of its limitation, the vulnerable households also fall in the financial shortage when the harvesting time has not come. In this case, they prefer firstly borrow from informal sectors, in which mainly living expenditure funded from moneylenders and more urgent cases granted by close friends and relatives. An interesting additional observation is that if the poor households have smaller agricultural investment than money availability, e.g. free cash from the banks' debt, this part of money used to improper purpose as their commitment to the bank. The phenomenon takes place if banks apply the lump-sum payment modality (Note 5). Pitifully, nearly 100% and 82% of VBSP's and VBARD's debt packages are disbursed through this repayment method, respectively. Table 3 also shows that 50% of VBSP-borrowers used their loan on consumption although their loan purpose was productive.
Look at Table 4 , there are several interesting findings here regarding the role of observed credit source. Compared to the essential role of VBARD in almost agricultural and non-agricultural activities was highlighted, contrary, VBSP has a very faint impact in general and insignificant in the improvement of agricultural activities in particular. Surprisingly, these loans have only significantly improved the living cost and food security. This is explained by two reasons, (i) VBSP has several targeting programs to improve the living standard of rural areas like clean water and sanitary constructions; and (ii) large of borrowers changed their loan purpose from productive to consumptive activities. With regards to the informal sources, it has a strongly positive effect on the cultivated area. In fact, the informal lenders provide the loan size depending on agricultural land of the poor borrowers. This is their most important tactic strategy in cases that the poor cannot pay the debt on time. As a result of the loss of agricultural land, the poor become impoverished and chronic poverty. Clearly, in order to support the poor to escape poverty, it is necessary to have synchronous and comprehensive perspectives, far beyond the simple scope of preferential credit. To provide a deeper insight into the contribution of formal credit to economic and non-economic activities, we make the classification the total sample into two categories: constrained and non-constrained households. Figure  4 sketches out the reality of households suffering from difficulties in access to formal credit. Briefly, physical collateral and social capital are the main drawbacks of the poor and smallholder farmer to obtain the satisfied loan from banks. There are two kinds of unsatisfied clients: (i) the group of borrowers received a loan with a lower amount. They are often the medium scale of agricultural production and their capitals (physical, social, human) are evaluated lower than the credit volume in their applications. (ii) the applicants rejected completely, compared to their desire. Sergio et al. (2000) called them the poorest of the poor. Most of them even cannot access to social policy credit because VBSP considers that they are beneficiaries of the poverty reduction programs nationwide (135, 30A as mentioned above). In reality, they receive non-reimbursable support, including little agricultural inputs and foods, that just help them to struggle against the hungry in a short time, but, it is not worth to improving their lives in the long term.
Based on the decomposition simultaneously by credit-constrained and agricultural-production-scale categories, the authors make the cross-comparative analyses among subgroups (Table 5) . Overall, it makes sense of that there are significant differentials in both of in terms of their investment in cultivation and livestock production and its effectiveness. Credit access effects positively on all agricultural activities of large-scale households, meanwhile this statistically significant impact is only partially presented in the remaining groups. It can be Figure 4 , it can be seen that there is a strong differential in terms of inequality of agricultural value addition in the research site. Overall, the Gini coefficient of the whole sample is 0.5242. This is higher than the ratio of the nation's residents and NMM region in 2016 at 0.431 and 0.433, respectively (GSO, 2016) . The Gini indexes at three studied districts also reveal interesting results. Surprisingly, Bao Thang, the district has the best banking industry, also is the highest level of inequality. This result is contrary to our initial hypothesis that financial development (i.e. increasing access to credit) significantly contributes to reducing the agricultural income gap and inequality. The household survey also reveals that local farmers are facing various credit and non-credit difficulties. More dangerously, many respondents reported that they success in access credit and enlarge their agricultural investment. However, their skill and knowledge have not enhanced properly with larger scale and/or new technical requirement of agricultural products. Consequently, they probably suffer from various difficulties related to markets, risks, climate..., and hence, to cause crop failure and unmarketable products, or both. It is concluded that in order to support the agriculture sector, only credit is not enough, but also it is required to have effective interventions to minimize risks and maximize profit for farmers.
In opposition, Muong Khuong banking sector is considered the lowest development level and the outreach of formal credit has also been obtained the limited result. As aforementioned, this puzzle comes from not only actors like borrowers, lenders, local authorities but also other related factors such as infrastructure, demography, and conception about debtors, especially ethnic minorities. Turn back to district Gini coefficient, here, it takes the value at 0.2581, the relatively ideal index compared to the global figure (Note 7). It seems that this is the unique bright point found out in the leaden picture as drew by Laquihon (1992) and Ranaweera (1993) , "the Asian uplands are characterized by poverty, hunger, hopelessness, discontent, greediness, and exploitation".
Unfortunately, the findings of the household survey show several latent consequences have been taking place under the effect of formal credit service disbursed through the community-based method. Specifically, local authorities play a crucial role in the screening process of banks in providing preferential credit through their assessment about applicants to banks. This process was taken place personally and objectively because of corruption and nepotism, hence, causing the negative impact on not only kith and kin but also non-kind relationships. This finding is consistent with the work of T. Dufhues (2007) and Hoang et al. (2016) conducted in Northern Vietnam. In addition, the poorer households usually use social capital (i.e. social network) as the most important type to overcome financial shock (Fischer et al., 2010) because it is not easy for them to access the saving and insurance service. Now, the vulnerable group felt that it is more difficult to apply this kind of capital and they felt to be isolated in their own community or relationship, or both. According to Kawachi et al. (1997) , the researcher hypothesized and proved that income inequality leads to increased mortality via disinvestment in social capital. The author concurs with this statement, and at the same time, warns policy-makers that poverty reduction programs need to be more effective and more accurately targeted to avoid conflicts in society and other unexpected consequences in upland areas, where ethnic minority tribes are living in.
Conclusions
Besides providing an agricultural credit market, the paper examines two levels of objectives: (1) the micro-impact of credit access on households' agricultural production and other welfares; (2) the community-impact on agricultural income inequality influenced by financial development. At the first contribution, the study points out that small farmers are suffering from the triple unreasonable disadvantages compared to the basic market fundamentals, the smallest loan amount, highest interest rate and the shortest duration. It is considered a kind of inequality of disadvantaged households in access to preferential credit, which is designed for them as the national fiscal burden. Among bank-borrowers, the role of VBARD deserves recognition by their customers, while that of VBSP is extremely fuzzy.
At the grass-root level, this paper finds out the significantly positive impact of formal credit access on total income, on-farm and off-farm, and living expenditure of local people. More specifically, better credit access enables to raise the agricultural investment, especially in small farmers, leading an increase in their output and value added. Compared to credit-constrained households, the non-constraint farmers clearly obtained higher effectiveness in livestock production but the differentiation in cultivating is mere and insignificant. Furthermore, the paper also finds the positive transition of the structure within the agriculture sector. More detailed, it is recognized that better credit access enables farmers to likely develop raising animals, that does not depend strongly on agricultural land. In the context of the scarcity of cultivated land, it plays an essential role in local livelihood and poverty reduction.
At the community-impact level, not as expected, it is highlighted that financial facilitation without agriculture-related supports causes to the negative effect on the agricultural outcomes and prolongs the inequality in the locality. In addition, under the community-based lending method, clerks heavily depend on the assessment of local authorities in order to make decisions on how loans approved. It may cause to not only the leakage of preferential credit but also weaken social capital in rural areas, especially in upland areas where almost ethnic minorities living.
With the aim of boosting the agricultural sector and rural development, absolutely, all concerns above must be removed. To do that, various steps and mechanisms needed also have to also change. For policy-makers, breaking the quasi-monopoly of the formal credit market is considered the first priority to create a competitive financial market toward market-oriented and sustainability. For banks, they need to change the mindset about target clients as Government's mandates, either commercial (VBARD) or development (VBSP) purpose, scratching out the drawback of farmer borrowers generated from banks' credit allocation. For farmers, it is necessary to enhance agricultural production and the niche market before trying to get a loan. Otherwise, they have to face with various unpredictable risks, especially their products strongly depend on the Chinese market. Besides develop some kinds of the cluster of agricultural production point, for example, the common interest groups (CIGs), farmers need to facilitate from the central Government through the investment in the productive infrastructure and agricultural service system.
